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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, : Case No. 890327-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Issues, 
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in 
Appellants opening brief at viii, ix, 1, and 1-11, respectively. 
Appellant takes this opportunity to reply to Respondent's arguments 
in Points I, III and IV of its brief. All issues not discussed 
herein are outlined in Appellant's opening brief. 
Mr. Sampson notes for the record that prior to filing this 
Reply Brief, counsel requested a thirty-day continuance of time to 
more fully address the issues of the case and also to postpone the 
scheduled oral argument for thirty days to afford necessary time to 
adequately prepare to represent him. Those motions with supporting 
rationale are attached together with stipulations from the State at 
Addendum A. A panel of this Court denied the motion to postpone 
oral argument and granted a one-week continuance in which to prepare 
the Reply Brief. See Court's order at Addendum B. Mr. Sampson 
objects to this Court's order as unnecessarily burdensome under the 
circumstances and violative of state and federal due process rights 
and the state constitutional right to appeal (Article I, § 12; see 
State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985)) as well as possibly 
implicating his constitutionally protected rights to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The facts of this case and accompanying legal analysis 
support the conclusion that Mr. Sampson was in custody when he was 
read Miranda rights. With custody established, this Court must 
address the issue of whether Mr. Sampson invoked his fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, specifically his right to 
counsel. 
The record establishes that Mr. Sampson objected at trial 
to the admission of the prejudicial photographs and slides properly 
preserving the issue for appeal. The State's waiver argument is 
tenuous, and the State further fails to establish the essentiality 
of the photographs and slides admitted over objections. 
This Court may examine the constitutionality of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-14-3 (Supp. 1989) contrary to the assertions of the 
State. A balancing of the interests of the State and Mr. Sampson 
demonstrates he, not the State, was prejudiced by the trial court's 
ruling prohibiting critical rebuttal testimony of Dr. Michael 
DeCaria. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. POLICE INTERROGATION OF MR. SAMPSON 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS AS OUTLINED IN MIRANDA AS 
PROTECTING HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
The State responds to Mr. Sampson's assertion that he was 
denied his fifth amendment rights to counsel as protected by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its progeny by claiming 
that Mr. Sampson was not "in custody" until he was "formally 
arrested" after the body of the victim was recovered (Brief of 
Respondent at 19) and that Miranda warnings were not required before 
that time.1 Brief of Respondent at 16-34. The State contends that 
Sgt. Elliott's Miranda warnings of November 25, 1986 were 
unnecessary, that he simply was excessively cautious in giving them, 
and that the subsequent discussion regarding whether Mr. Sampson 
equivocally invoked his right to counsel is irrelevant. Brief of 
Respondent at 28, 31. The State did not address the question of 
whether Mr. Sampson invoked his right to counsel. Brief of 
Respondent at 16-34. 
The failure to address the invocation-of-counsel question 
1
 At trial, the State took a different position than that 
now urged on appeal arguing that Mr. Sampson was not in custody but 
that the Miranda warnings he received from Sgt. Elliott prior to the 
polygraph interrogation session of November 25, 1986 properly 
advised him of his rights under the fifth amendment and that he did 
not specifically request counsel but chose to voluntarily talk to 
police (R. 145-62). While it is questionable that the State can 
alter its position on appeal, either argument must necessarily fail 
as Appellant was in custody and invoked his fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 
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is fatal to the State's argument. It was this question, not 
custody, that the court addressed in denying Mr. Sampson's motion to 
suppress (MS. 36-37). It is this ruling that Mr. Sampson is 
challenging on appeal, and it is this issue which must be addressed 
by this Court. Mr. Sampson nonetheless replies to the State's claim 
of no custody relying on his opening brief to address the more 
pertinent issue of his invocation of the fifth amendment right to 
counsel. 
To support its position, the State omitted and/or distorted 
critical facts essential to the fair determination of the question 
of custody. The State failed to address the trial court's ruling on 
the motion to suppress. Following the arguments of counsel, the 
court immediately issued its decision (MS. 3 6-3 7); those findings 
are attached at Addendum C. In its ruling, the court did not 
expressly address the question of custody. Rather, the court found 
the Miranda warning to be proper, recognizing that Mr. Sampson had 
rights and voluntarily waived them. The court stated: 
[T]he court finds that the defendant clearly 
understood what his rights were and what he was 
waiving, that there is nothing in the record to show 
that the police did anything or acted in any way 
improperly so as to constitute any kind of coercion 
in this matter . . .(MS. at 36). 
Implicit in the ruling of the court is a finding that Mr. Sampson 
was in custody. Analytically, one cannot waive rights he does not 
possess; before Mr. Sampson could enjoy the rights recognized by the 
court, a finding of custody was required. Miranda v. Arizona, 3 84 
U.S. at 461. 
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A second fact left inadequately addressed in the State's 
analysis of custody is the fact that Sgt. Elliott perceived that 
Mr. Sampson was in custody and that he was required to give the 
warnings to Mr. Sampson to protect his constitutional rights. After 
informing Mr. Sampson that the "two things" that the polygraph would 
focus on were whether Mr. Sampson had prearranged with anyone to 
kidnap the child and whether Mr. Sampson was involved in the death 
of the child, if, in fact, the child was dead, Sgt. Elliott stated: 
[S]ince [this] is a polygraph examination being 
conducted in conjunction with a criminal matter, uh, 
that is a police report. Because you are in the cop 
shop there is no doubt in your mind that this is the 
police station and, uh, because you are taking a 
polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must 
advise you of your rights again (R. 119). 
During testimony at the preliminary hearing, Sgt. Elliott 
explained that the reason he gave the Miranda warnings was to 
protect the individual's rights, recognizing that something might be 
said during the examination which might have criminal consequences 
and he always desires that the accused, in this case Mr. Sampson, 
understand that fact exactly (PHT. 97-98). Additionally, 
Sgt. Elliott indicated he knew Mr. Sampson to be a suspect for a 
criminal offense, again acknowledging that through the process of 
the polygraph examination, suspicions could, and in this case did, 
increase along with criminal consequences (PHT. 100-01). 
Sgt. Elliott's analysis of the situation as he understood 
it is very significant to the finding of custody. The fact that he 
informed Mr. Sampson of his fifth amendment rights to silence and 
counsel is perhaps the best indication that the situation is 
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tantamount to custody. The State's failure to adequately and 
genuinely address the assessment of its own agent on the issue of 
custody is unconvincing, especially when at the same time in its 
brief, the State attempts to suggest that Mr. Sampson's failure to 
acknowledge his "arrest" demonstrates that he must have felt he was 
not in custody. Brief of Respondent at 31. A recognizable 
distinction exits between an awareness of arrest and a feeling that 
one is not free to leave. Contrary to the State's assertions, 
custody and arrest are not always synonymous. 
Additional corrections of the facts are required. The 
State indicates in an innocuous fashion that Mr. Sampson simply 
"went to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice . . . for the purpose of 
taking a polygraph test." Brief of Respondent at 28. The facts 
disclose the circumstances to have been much less voluntary and 
willing than the State posits. Testimony reveals that Mr. Sampson 
left the police station at approximately 3:20 a.m. to 4:00 a.m. on 
November 25, 1986 and was "instructed" by police to return at 
10:30 a.m. or 11:00 a.m. the same day (PHT. 94; T. 301-02, 317, 
337-38). 
The State also indicates Mr. Sampson "had freedom of 
movement" and "was left alone at times" during the questioning. 
Brief of Respondent at 8, 29. The State cites a quotation from the 
record to support the claim. Brief of Respondent at 30. That 
quotation, however, is not present where it is represented to be 
and, more importantly, does not support the premise. The quotation 
reveals that Sgt. Elliott would "show" Mr. Sampson where the 
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fountain was. Not only can that mean that he would accompany him, 
but the ninth floor of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, and this 
interrogation room in particular, was just off the main detective 
area (squad room) occupied by approximately twenty-five police 
officers during the time of the examination (PHT. 77, 96). 
Additionally, the State fails to recognize that when Sgt. Elliott 
went to report to the sheriff and the captain, he did not leave 
Mr. Sampson alone but had Mr. Sampson walk with him to that office2 
and that the sheriff and others then accompanied Mr. Sampson back to 
the interrogation room (PHT. 99-100; T. 341-42). 
Beyond the point where Mr. Sampson informs the sheriff that 
his child is dead, the State's claim that Mr. Sampson was still not 
in custody—absent the "formal arrest"—cannot be taken seriously. 
Brief of Respondent at 33. After the interviews of all involved, 
the night of November 24 and the early morning hours of November 25, 
police concluded that Mr. Sampson was a suspect in the kidnapping or 
death of the child. For that reason, he was "instructed" to return 
for the polygraph examination as a suspect. When analyzing the 
facts noted above and those interspersed infra in conjunction with 
the legal standard found in State v. Kelley, 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 
1986), Mr. Sampson was in custody. 
The site of the interrogation was the "cop shop," as noted 
by Sgt. Elliott and as "instructed" by the officers at 4:00 a.m. the 
2
 Sgt. Elliott actually testified that "We took him to the 
captain's office," indicating more than one individual was escorting 
Mr. Sampson (PHT. 100). 
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prior day. The investigation focused on Mr. Sampson, as clearly 
indicated in the two-part purpose of the polygraph test as explained 
by Sgt. Elliott (R. 119) and as recognized by the officers just 
prior to completing their interviews that early morning (T. 321). 
The above factors coupled with the physical setup of the 
interrogation, the full squad room, the lengthy preparatory 
discussion about the polygraph (R. 116-19), the focus of the 
questions, and the examiner's own assessment of the situation 
cogently expressed to Mr. Sampson all support that Mr. Sampson 
reasonably would consider himself not free to leave.3 
Finally, it becomes hard to imagine an interrogation, short 
of violence and torture, more compulsory and accusatory than the 
nature and form of the polygraph examination where one is physically 
attached to a machine and repeatedly queried over an extended period 
of time. See United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 412-14 
(8th Cir. 1978), and People v. Close, 456 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1982), where 
suspects who agreed to take lie detector tests at the request of the 
3
 This third factor of Kellev is identified as the 
presence of an objective indicia of arrest. 718 P.2d at 391. This 
factor is examined not as an actual arrest. No magic words are 
required. Rather, the cases support this factor to be analyzed 
under a reasonable person standard. Respondent recognizes this 
standard expressly (Brief of Respondent at 30) and through cases 
cited in its brief. Brief of Respondent at 18, 20, 21. Mr. Sampson 
disputes Respondent's added claim, however, that the reasonable 
person is required to be innocent, asserting that claim is ill 
supported and contrary to analogous situations which recognize the 
need for the introduction of a suggestive component into the 
balancing. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) 
(discussing voluntariness of waiver, indicates case hinges on 
particular facts and circumstances such as background of defendant, 
experience and conduct); accord Fare v. Michael C.. 442 U.S. 707, 
725-26 (1979) (adding age, education, intelligence). 
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police stopped the examinations after being "Mirandized" and 
confessed to officers noting their inability to pass the polygraph. 
The compulsion exemplified in these two cases is precisely why the 
police use polygraph examinations as an interrogation tool. 
Importantly, it is this compulsion inherent in the polygraph 
examination which requires the Miranda warnings to be given to 
safeguard the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. 
The conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. 
Wright, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268-69 (NJ 1984) is well founded: 
We find little merit in the State's suggestion that 
questioning that takes place before, during, or 
after a lie detector test is somehow materially 
different from "custodial interrogation." 
In this case, the State's own interrogator, Sgt. Elliott, agreed 
with the above quote. The trial court in its ruling also agreed, at 
least implicitly, as did the United States Supreme Court in 
Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1983). In Wyrick v. Fields, contrary 
to the State's claim (Brief of Respondent at 27), the Court 
expressly approved, per curiam, a pre-polygraph examination Miranda 
warning, noting that "the Eighth Circuit acknowledged—as it had 
to—that [t]here is no question that Fields waived his right to have 
counsel present while the [polygraph] examination itself was being 
conducted." Id. at 46 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). The 
Supreme Court recognized that Fields had a right to counsel during 
his polygraph and that he necessarily must have been warned pursuant 
to Miranda. Notably, the Court did not question custody despite the 
fact that Fields requested a polygraph examination after being 
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charged with a crime but while released on his own recognizance. 
Id. at 43-44. See also Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 901 (Alaska 
1979), and United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 412-14 (8th 
Cir. 1978), where both courts acknowledged the better practice is to 
require Miranda warnings for those taking polygraph examinations. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should agree custody 
is established and then evaluate the argument presented in 
Mr. Sampson's opening brief and find that his fifth amendment right 
to counsel was violated by the police interrogation method employed 
in this case. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO REMOVE FOR CAUSE TWO JURORS 
WHO ADMITTED THE INABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL. 
(NO REPLY) 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT ADMITTED OVER OBJECTION PREJUDICIAL 
PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES OF THE DEAD CHILD'S BODY. 
The State responds to Mr. Sampson's assertions of 
prejudicial error regarding the admission of photographs and slides 
by claiming that he waived objecting to most of the photographs and 
that the remaining photographs and repetitive slides were 
probative. Brief of Respondent at 37-51. The State's waiver 
argument is without merit; the claim of probativeness misses the 
point by failing to address the State's burden of establishing the 
essentiality of the photographs and slides as outlined in the 
opening brief. Brief of Appellant at 39-46. 
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While conceding the record is laborious regarding the 
photographs and slides, there can be no mistake but that Mr. Sampson 
timely objected to photographic exhibits numbered 8-22 (excepting a 
non-photograph exhibit numbered 13) and all sixteen slides. A 
motion in limine was filed with the court prior to trial challenging 
the essentiality of the photographs and noting their prejudicial 
nature (R. 218). 
During trial but before any objectionable photographs were 
introduced, the motion in limine was handled out of the presence of 
the jury (T. 355-71, 531-60). Regarding photographs numbered 14-22, 
defense counsel suggested objecting only to number 19 and conceding 
relevance of the others (T. 358-59). The prosecution appeared to 
agree (T. 359); but after the trial court indicated it would deny an 
objection to number 19, the State withdrew its concession to 
withhold number 19 from the jury (T. 359-60). Defense counsel then 
also retracted its concession to the other photographs—numbers 14, 
15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21 and 22—expressly reserving the right to 
object to all the photographs (T. 367). The trial court expressly 
indicated that Mr. Sampson would be entitled to object to the 
admission of all the photographs at trial (T. 368). Counsel then 
opted for a continuing objection to avoid continuously jumping up 
before the jury (T. 370-71). The court granted that request 
indicating it would instruct the jury that the pictures were 
admitted over the objection of defense counsel (T. 371). 
The State's attempt to attach waiver significance to the 
statement of counsel in the context of the hearing and the totality 
of what occurred is untenable. Brief of Respondent at 45. The 
record as a whole discloses that, in addition to the motion in 
limine, specific and continuing objections were made on the 
photographic exhibits as follows: number 8 (T. 360-61, 367, 450); 
number 9 (T. 360-61, 367, 450); number 10 (T. 360, 450); number 11 
(T. 360, 450); number 12—no objection; and numbers 14-22 (T. 367, 
370-71, 583).4 All sixteen of the slides were objected to (T. 
)and the court sua sponte again recognized a continuing objection as 
to all slides while discussing the question of properly preserving 
the record for appeal (T. 590). 
More specific objections are interspersed throughout the 
record as noted in the opening brief. However, the above discussion 
illuminates that photographic exhibits numbers 8-12 and numbers 
14-22 and all slides were properly objected to at trial, and the 
issue of their admittance and presentment to jurors is properly 
before this Court for review. Moreover, it is important to note 
that the usual presumption for admissibility does not apply to 
gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse; under Rule 403, 
the burden to establish admissibility of such evidence shifts to the 
proponent once reasonably attacked as unfairly prejudicial with the 
potentiality of inflaming the jurors' passions and misleading the 
4
 Contrary to the State's assertion waiver (Brief of 
Respondent at 45), the trial court, in response to State's motion to 
introduce numbers 14-22, stated, "I would anticipate your objection 
would continue as to those exhibits and the objection in relation to 
the conversation we had outside the presence of the jury would also 
be preserved." Defense counsel responded, "thank you" (T. 583). 
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jurors' decisions. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 
1989) . That challenge to the photographs and slides in this case 
was made pursuant to the above-described motion in limine (R. 218). 
This shift presumes that the prejudice in the photographs 
outweighs the probative value requiring that the prosecution 
establish the essentiality of the proffered evidence. 780 P.2d at 
1229. The State did not and cannot make this argument of 
essentiality. Brief of Respondent at 37-51. Accordingly, this 
Court must find prejudicial error from the admission of the 
photographs, reverse the conviction, and remand this case for a new 
trial as outlined in Appellant's opening brief. Brief of Appellant 
at 39-53. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW TESTIMONY FROM 
DEFENSE WITNESS DR. DECARIA UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 77-14-3. 
The State insists that a constitutional challenge to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-14-3 is imappropriate in this case because no smiliar 
attack was made in the court below. Brief of Respondent at 56 
(citing State v. Laird, 601 P.d 926, 927 (Utah 1979)). The State is 
in error, and its reliance on State v. Laird is misplaced. The 
premise that a defendant cannot raise such an issue for the first 
time on appeal, as reiterated in State v. Laird, has an exception 
applicable to this case. When a person's liberty is at stake, as is 
Mr. Sampson's in this case, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a 
clear exception to the above rule and permitted examination of 
constitutional questions. State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443 
(Utah 1983); Pratt v. City Council of City of Riverton. 639 P.2d 
172, 173-74 (Utah 1981). Accordingly, the constitutional issue is 
properly before this Court. 
In addressing the merits of the claim, the State makes two 
additional errors. The State misreads Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 
400 (1988), to effectively dispose of Mr. Sampson's claim when the 
strength of Taylor v. Illinois is its focus on balancing the 
interests. Ironically, both parties asserted claims of prejudice 
regarding the issue. A balancing or examination of those asserted 
prejudices is helpful to resolve this question. 
The State's claim of prejudice is grounded in surprise and 
a desired compliance with a state statute, a very "broad scoped11 
state statute as recognized by Respondent. Brief of Respondent at 
53. 
On the other hand, Mr. Sampson also claims prejudice 
because of surprise, an inability to have guessed the State's heavy 
reliance on demeanor testimony. His claim of surprise is buttressed 
by state and federal constitutional provisions, however, and not a 
statute. Moreover, his prejudice is not harmless as indicated by 
the State (Brief of Respondent at 58-59) because it goes directly to 
an issue the State maintained as critically important to its case, 
the demeanor testimony (T. 377-78). 
Because of the State's reliance on demeanor testimony, 
which went unrebutted because of the court's ruling, Mr. Sampson 
cannot correct the error, i.e., it is harmful. To the contrary, the 
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State's prejudice, if indeed it exists (T. 506-07 (quoted in opening 
brief at 57)), could have been assuaged by virtue of a short 
continuance. 
Finally, the State unfairly attacks the motives behind 
Dr. DeCaria's late-announced testimony by exhorting a primary 
objective other than that noted in Mr. Sampson's opening brief. 
Brief of Respondent at 54-55. This attack is made despite 
recognizing the dual objectives it advances as being "somewhat 
similar." Brief of Respondent at 55. To the extent this Court 
might find the State's interpretation persuasive, Mr. Sampson urges 
the Court to acknowledge that the trial court could easily have 
limited the testimony of Dr. DeCaria to the rebuttal testimony 
regarding the significance of demeanor evidence. With that 
testimony before the jurors, the likelihood of a different outcome 
is substantial such that confidence in the verdict as rendered is 
reduced and a new trial warranted. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1987). 
POINT V. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN MR. SAMPSONS CONVICTION OF 
SECOND DEGREE MURDER. 
(NO REPLY) 
POINT VI. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE DEFINITION OF DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE OVER 
THE OBJECTION OF MR. SAMPSON. 
(NO REPLY) 
POINT VII. THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTORS 
PREJUDICED MR. SAMPSON AND DENIED HIM HIS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
(NO REPLY) 
POINT VIII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN THIS 
CASE DENIED MR. SAMPSON HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
(NO REPLY) 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons and those advanced 
in the opening brief and at oral argument, Appellant, Carlos 
Reinaldo Sampson, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial or alternatively 
impose judgment against him for Manslaughter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this // ^ day of January, 1990. 
fHjARI 
Attorney for Defendant/^ llant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Of f ice, 2 3£... St ate Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /' " da^of January, A9SA 
DELIVERED by 
of January, 1990. 
this day 
ADDENDUM A 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MOTION, STIPULATION AND 
ORDER TO EXTEND TIME 
FOR PREPARATION OF 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
AND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No. 890327-CA 
Pursuant to Rules 22(b) and 29(b), Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, RICHARD G. UDAY, attorney for Appellant, hereby moves 
this Court for a thirty-day extension of time in which to file 
Appellant's Reply Brief up to and including the 29th day of January, 
1990 and for a postponement of oral argument for thirty days up to 
and including the 15th day of February, 1990. 
Counsel is currently working on two capital cases with 
deadline demands that require the extension and postponement 
requested in this case. Counsel is working on the opening brief in 
State v. Menzies, Case No. 880161, currently due January 6, 1990. 
Counsel has also prepared a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and 
Conviction and/or for New Trial in the Menzies case. That motion 
and the Stated response thereto have resulted in a hearing before 
the Utah Supreme Court and a hearing in the Third District Court. 
Follow-up motions and a proposal were then filed, and a second 
hearing is scheduled before the Utah Supreme Court on January 2, 
1990. The workload to prepare for these hearings and filings in the 
Menzies case has precluded and precludes preparation of the Reply 
Brief in the Sampson case as currently scheduled. Counsel is also 
preparing portions of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be filed 
in the United States Supreme Court in the case of State v. Gardner, 
Case No. 021027. That writ is due January 14, 1990. Preparation of 
the writ in this capital case will preclude any available time to 
prepare the Reply Brief prior to the scheduled oral argument in 
State v. Sampson. 
The workload required to meet the deadlines in the above 
two capital cases make the prepartion of the Reply Brief and the 
oral argument as scheduled in State v. Sampson impossible to meet. 
Because capital cases are first priority in the scheduling of cases 
(see appendix to Rules of the Utah Supreme Court), the information 
outlined above establishes the exigent circumstances necessray to 
support the motion for continuance. 
This is the first extension for this Reply Brief. No 
further extensions are anticipated. The Reply Brief is currently 
due on the 30th day of December, 1989. 
This is the first postponement request for the oral 
argument. The oral argument is currently scheduled for January 16, 
1990. jJ 
DATED this rTu day of Decemb* 
STIPULATION 
I,
 mt Assistant Attorney General, 
do hereby stipulate to the above motion for extension of time for 
preparation of Appellant's Reply Brief and postponement of the oral 
argument on the grounds as set forth therein. 
DATED this day of December, 1939. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an extension of time be given to 
Appellant for the preparation of Appellant's Reply Brief up to and 
including the 29th day of January, 1990 and for postponement of the 
oral argument for thirty days up to and including the 15th day of 
February, 1990. 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this _; 
day of December, 1989. 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION, STIPULATION AND 
ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME FOR 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : ORAL ARGUMENT 
V. J 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, : Case No. 890327-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Pursuant to Rule 29(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
RICHARD G. UDAY, attorney for Appellant, hereby moves this Court for 
an enlargement of the time in which to present Oral Argument from 
fifteen (15) minutes to thirty (30) minutes. 
This Court has allowed enlarged briefing in this case 
because of the number and complexities of the issues presented. 
Appellant's opening brief contains eight issues—many of those with 
subpoints—and is eighty-four pages in length. Respondent's brief 
addresses all issues and totals seventy-six pages. 
Because of the serious and complex nature of the issues, 
counsel requests additional time be allotted for oral argument to 
fully address the issues. 
M 4 DATED this rfP day of December 
1/ 
STIPULATION 
, Assistant Attorney General, 
do hereby stipulate to the above motion for enlargement of time for 
the oral argument on the grounds as set forth therein. 
DATED this , day of December, 1989. 
L 
ASSISTANT'ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ORDER 
Based upon motion of Appellant and stipulation of counsel 
and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that an enlargement of time be given 
to Appellant for the oral argument from fifteen minutes to thirty 
minutes. 
DATED this day of December, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
COURT OF APPEALS JUDGE 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
day of December, 1989. 
- ^ 
K\V & 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
NOTICE OF 
ORAL 
ARGUMENT 
Andrew A. Valdez 
Elizabeth A. Bowman 
Richard G. Uday 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Carlos R. Sampson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 890327-CA 
This case is set for oral argument on Tuesday, January 16, 1990 at 9:00 
a.m. before a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 
400. Oral argument is limited to fifteen minutes per side. 
Counsel, if a party is represented by counsel, or the party must 
complete the information requested below and return this notice to the Court 
of Appeals no later than December 28, 1989. A motion for continuance, if any, 
must also be received by this date. 
Oral argument will not be continued absent a proper motion and 
stipulation of all parties. A motion for continuance will be granted only 
upon a showing of exigent circumstances. Specifically, a continuance will not 
be granted for reasons of a scheduling conflict, including a previously 
scheduled appearance in a lower court. If all parties do not stipulate to the 
continuance or if an emergency circumstance is not shown, oral argument will 
proceed as herein scheduled. 
This 13th day of December, 1989. BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
* 
PLcase Hirc l e : 
Vcdoy 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
(do not) request oral argument. 
I certify that this case has not been settled, discharged or stayed by 
bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot. If this case should be settled, 
discharged or stayed by bankruptcy, or otherwise rendered moot, I will notify 
the Court as soon as possible in accordance with Rule 37 of the Court of 
Appeals, ^understand that failure to take such action may be grounds for 
40 off the Court of Appeals or for contempt of court under 
&/3Sffl 
Date 
NOTE: A CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ON OPPOSING COUNSEL 
MUST BE ATTACHED WHEN RETURNING THIS FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General/s Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this ^,J day of December, 1989. 
i/ 
ADDENDUM B 
fBOOP % m --i-1 F n 
JAN 3/J990 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS t W c f i r * Court 
U£»n*£ourt & Apoaate 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Carlos R. Sampson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 890327-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme. 
The court having considered appellant's motion for 
enlargement of time to file reply brief and motion for 
additional time for oral argument hereby orders as follows: 
1. Appellant's reply brief may be filed not later than 
5:00 p.m. on Thursday, January 11, 1990. 
2. The court will permit argument by each side of at least 
20 minutes and counsel should plan for an argument of that 
length. If at the time of argument it appears to the court 
that additional time for argument will promote the court's 
understanding of the issues in this case, the court will permit 
such additional time for argument as the court deems necessary 
in its discretion. 
3. In view of the extra time which argument will take in 
this case, this case will be moved from first to third place on 
the court's calendar. 
DATED this sssL^X^day of January, 1990, 
FOR THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of January, 1990, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail, 
Andrew A. Valdez 
Elizabeth A. Bowman 
Richard G. Uday 
Attorneys at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Charlene Barlow 
Assistant Attorney General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1990. 
By '- . due** < *&/ 
^ Deputy Clerk/ 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COM 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
PLAINTIFF, ) CIVIL NO. CR-87-^97 
-VS- ) 
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON, ) MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
DEFENDANT. ) 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON FRIDAY, THE 28TH DAY 
OF AUGUST, 1987, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:18 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 1 
1 FACTS THAT THE STATE ASSERTS FOLLOWING THE MIRANDA REGARDING 
2 WHETHER OR NOT MR. SAMPSON LIED AND ISSUES ABOUT THE BODY. 
3 THOSE, I THINK, ARE INFLAMMATORY AND NOT BASED UPON THE 
4 LAW. LOOKING AT THE LAW THE LAW REGARDS THE MIRANDA ISSUE 
5 WHICH PRECEEDED ANY STATEMENTS THAT MR. SAMPSON MADE--AND 
6 WE ASK YOU TO LOOK BEYOND ANYTHING THE STATE MAY HAVE SAID. 
7 CLEARLY, THOSE ISSUES ARE IN DISPUTE, HAVE NOTHING TO DO 
8 WITH MIRANDA OR NO MIRANDA. BUT WE ASK YOU NOT TO BE 
9 PERSUADED BY THOSE ARGUMENTS AND TO RULE ON THE LAW. THANK 
10 YOU. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: THIS MATTER IS SET FOR TRIAL IN 
12 A FEW WEEKS AND IT'S APPROPRIATE THAT YOU EACH KNOW THE 
13 COURT'S RULING WELL IN ADVANCE OF THAT SO THAT YOU CAN HAVE 
14 AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE FOR TRIAL. FOR THAT 
15 REASON I AM GOING TO RULE ON THIS AT THIS TIME. 
16 THE COURT FINDS, FIRST, THAT AS YOU HAVE AGREED, 
17 THE STANDARD OF EVIDENCE MUST BE A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
18 EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE VOLUNTARINESS OF THE INTERROGATION 
19 AND THE WAIVER. 
20 COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD 
21 WHAT HIS RIGHTS WERE AND WHAT HE WAS WAIVING, THAT THERE 
22 IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT THE POLICE DID ANY-
23 THING OR ACTED IN ANY WAY IMPROPERLY SO AS TO CONSTITUTE 
24 ANY KIND OF COERCION IN THIS MATTER SO AS TO CAUSE THE 
25 DEFENDANT NOT TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS RIGHTS AND TO LEAVE 
36 
1 HIM IN A POSITION WHERE HE WAS ACTING IN A COERCED SORT 
2 OF WAY. IF THERE WAS COERCION HERE IT WAS SELF-INFLICTED. 
3 THE DEFENDANT, PERHAPS, FELT THE PRESSURE OF CONSCIENCE 
4 OR THE PRESSURE OF HIS OWN CIRCUMSTANCES BUT I DON'T FIND 
5 ANY CONDUCT OF THE POLICE, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
6 CASE, TO JUSTIFY THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY CAUSED 
7 THE DEFENDANT TO IMPROPERLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
8 I BELIEVE HE HAD AN UNFETTERED RIGHT OF CHOICE, 
9 THAT HE DID NOT REQUEST AN ATTORNEY, THAT THE LANGUAGE 
10 "WELL, AH, SHOULD I HAVE A LAWYER, I MEAN, WELL, I'M REALLY 
11 NOT WORRIED ABOUT ANYTHING, IT IS JUST THAT . . ." IS NOT 
12 SUFFICIENT TO CAUSE THE POLICE TO BE CONCERNED AS TO THE 
13 CLAIM OR ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE DEFENDANT WISHED TO CLAIM 
14 A RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
15 I ALSO FIND THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO GIVE 
16 CONTINUOUS ADVICE AS TO SUBSEQUENT REQUESTS FOR THE SELECTION! 
17 OF COUNSEL OR THE WAIVER OF THE SAME. 
18 I FIND FURTHER THAT THE FORUM WAS ADEQUATE, THE 
19 PLUSES WERE CLEARLY EXPLAINED TO THE DEFENDANT. HE VOLUN-
20 TARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND I CAN-
21 NOT FIND THAT THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD BE GRANTED AND, 
22 THEREFORE, IT IS DENIED. 
23 ANYTHING FURTHER? WE WILL BE IN RECESS. 
24 (WHEREUPON, THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING WAS 
25 CONCLUDED). 
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